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COUNTRY Poland

REPORT

SUBJECT Observations on the Gomulka Regime and Western Policy Toward Poland (Gomulka)

DATE DISTR.

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has interest of worked at heart, but has to depend for economic advice on opportunities. West should educate Gomulka)

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report containing the observations of a recent Polish vice minister on the Gomulka regime and Western policy toward Poland.

9 JAN RECD

10 JAN 1958

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
PLEASE ROUTE

16 JAN 1958

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Enclosure A

COUNTRY: Poland

DATE: 28 October 1957

SUBJECT: Observations on the Gomulka Regime and
Western Policy toward Poland

NO. OF. PAGES: 2

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COUNTRY:

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1. [redacted] credited Polish Party Secretary Gomulka with having the best interests of the Polish worker at heart but [redacted] was limited by his over-dependence on a few close advisors who held to the classical Communist economic theory and encouraged his disapproval of apparently sound proposals made by the more qualified Polish economists. [redacted] economic mistakes could bring about Gomulka's downfall.

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Rather than direct material aid, [redacted] recommended: (1) that Gomulka and his economic advisors be "educated" through delegation visits to the West; and (2) that [redacted] broadcasters to Poland suggest specific proposals by which the regime could improve Poland's economic situation and in this way bring the pressure of Polish public opinion to bear more directly and more intelligently on Gomulka and his advisors.

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2. [redacted] Gomulka [redacted] an ascetic individual dedicated to the promotion of the welfare of Polish workers through Communism. In comparing Tito and Gomulka, [redacted] Tito would sacrifice all of Yugoslavia to promote his own interests, while Gomulka would resign his present post immediately if he felt that he was not working in the best interests of the Polish working class. Even though his elevation to the post of secretary in October 1956 was the result of Gomulka's political astuteness, subsequent developments increased the importance of economic factors to such an extent that in 1957 they could be said to take priority over political matters. Gomulka was very weak in the economic field, and for advice in this area he chose to depend on the opportunist Piotr Jaroszewicz and three or four doctrinaire party economists who were very anxious to improve Poland's economic welfare, but only within the framework of standard Communist principles and practices.

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3. Contrasted to this group were the persons associated with the Economic Council (Rada Ekonomiczna - RE). Among these were progressive individuals like Stefan Jedrychowski, Czeslaw Bobrowski and Dr. Lipinski, all trained economists who were thoroughly acquainted not only with Communist economics but also with western economic theories. [redacted] Jedrychowski and Bobrowski advance what appeared to be sound proposals for economic improvements; however, they failed to win Gomulka's approval because the Secretary's intimate circle of advisors was opposed to them. 50X1-HUM
4. [redacted] Gomulka's economic mistakes might well bring about his ultimate downfall. To prevent this and to enable Poland to proceed along its present path of limited independence, Gomulka must be educated through direct contact with the West. Any direct offers of aid, other than monetary, would be rejected, but if Gomulka were given an opportunity to personally examine the conditions under which western labor lived and worked, [redacted] he would alter his present point of view. If Gomulka and one or more of his economic experts, such as Jedrychowski, Bobrowski or Lipinski, were to receive an invitation for visits [redacted] and if they had the opportunity to enter the homes of workers and to inspect their places of work, Gomulka might take a completely different attitude toward the Polish experts' suggestions which before he rejected. After such a visit, some economic proposals made by the objective Polish economic advisors might gain acceptance even though they tended to lighten Poland's dependence on the Soviet Union. 50X1-HUM
5. An important fact which [redacted] had not been taken into consideration by the West was that the Economic Council was making every effort to come up with reasonable solutions to Poland's economic problems. As indicated above, many of these were being rejected by Gomulka and his circle of Party advisors. However, if [redacted] broadcasts directed to Poland could include specific recommendations giving concrete examples as to how Polish living standards could be improved, Gomulka might be forced to yield to worker pressure demanding such improvements. In this manner, Gomulka would be forced to intensify action in fields of economic activity along lines which could be made the means of pushing Poland away from the arms of Moscow. [redacted] for the time being it was to the best interests of the USSR to retain Gomulka in power. [redacted] if the West could effectively capitalize on Gomulka's own interest in improving the workers' lot by educating him in the economic progress made by the West, Poland's cause would be served. If western recommendations for the solution of Poland's economic problems were based on sound workable foundations, public opinion would either force the Gomulka government into adopting some of them or force important officials into giving sound reasons for their failure to do so. [redacted] in making any recommendations, western propaganda media would naturally have to bear in mind both Poland's vulnerable geographic position and the overall Eastern European political situation. 50X1-HUM

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